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In the Supreme Court
OPTHE

State of Utah
NORTHERN OIL COMPANY,
Appellant,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF PLACE-MENT AND UNEMPLOY-MENT INSURANCE and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH,
Defendants.

ase No. 6373

J

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a petition for review :filed by the
Northern Oil Company as an appeal from a decision ren-dered by the Industrial Commission of Utah with respect
to the contribution liability of the Northern Oil Company
under the provisions of the Utah Unemployment Compen-sation Law, Chapter 52, Laws of Utah, 1939.
The company is an employer subject to the provisions
of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law, and it was
so subject during the years of 1938, 1939, and 1940. Over
such a period of time, it continuously :filed reports and paid
contributions with respect to its employment.
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In the. early part of 1941, an audit was made of the
recqrds of the company which disclosed a failure upon the
part of the company to report the remuneration paid by the
oompany to solicitors who were paid on a commission
basis and upon remuneration paid to officers and other
employees in the form of stock.
On the basis of this audit~ an initial determination was
rendered on February 13, 1941. The company questioned
the propri•ety_ of the determination and filed an application
for review resulting in a review decision dated March 18,
1941, which review decision upheld the previous decision.
On March 2 5, 1941, the company filed an appeal
before the Appeal Tribunal. Hearings were held April
2 and April 5, 1941, and a decision rendered on April19,
1941, which, although modifying the initial determination
by excluding certain of the stock payment~ upheld the
position of th~ Department of Placement and Unemployment
Insurance that the commission solicitors were ""in employ'
ment .,., within the provisions of Sections 19 (j) ( 1) and 19 (j)
( 5) of the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law, that
remuneration paid to its officers and employees by means
of stock certificates. constituted ""wages"" within the meaning
of Section 19 (p) of the Utah Unemployment Compensa'
tion :law, upon which the company owed ~ontribution
liability and that the value of such stock was ten cents per
share.

On April 28, 1941, an appeal to the Industrial Oom,
mission was filed by the c9mpany, which appeal resulted in
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the decision of the Industrial Commission, dated May 9,
1941, upholding the decision of the Appeal Tribunal from
which the petition to this court was filed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The Northern Oil Company is a corporation and was
during the years 1938, 1939, and 1940 engaged in the
business of promoting the drilling of an oil well and of
selling stock of the oompany to the public for the purpose
of financing. such drilling operations.
In selling the stock of the company, it created a selling
orga~ation made up of a sales manager who was in charge
of the activities of several division managers. The division
managers, in turn, were among other things required to
create selling organizations under them formed of solicitors,
the type of worker whose status is questioned herein. (Tr.
12, 13) For such services the division manager was paid
a gross commission of twenty. . five per cent of all sales of
stock made by him. With this twenty. .five per cent com. .
mission, the sales manager was authorized to pay such
expenses as he found necessary to procure the services of
solicitors and conduct selling activities. Any balance re . .
maining was to be considered his net earnings. (Tr. 14.-18)
He was subject to the supervision and control of the sales
manager, adapted his selling system to the organizational
program of the sales manager, and was concededly by stipu.lation of the parties ""in en1ploymenf" for the company.
(Tr. 46)
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The division manager followed the practice of con"
tacting ·various individuals to learn if they desired to act
for him as solicitors and arranged to pay them a percentage
of the stock sales as a commission. {Tr. 18) Upon making
such an arrangement with any solicitors, the division man.
ager would advise the company of the arrangements made
in order that the company could, at regular intervals, pay
to the division manager and the solicitors their respective
commtsstons. ( T r. 12--1 7, 3 3, 36) Payments to the solici.
tors were made by checks of the oompany or more generally
by means of cash pay envelopes obtained by the solicitor
from employees of the oompany.
With this type of sales organization, the company
evolved a selling system which was regularly followed during
the period in question. The solicitors, whenever possible,
attended sales meetings conducted every morning by the
general sales manager; such sales meetings would be attend·
ed by the division manager and by the solicitors. (Tr. 20,
37) During such sales meetings, a discussion of sales
methods would be had, the solicitors would be given a
description of the progress made in the drilling of the oil
well and, in general, ""enthused'" with the progress and
advancement of the company.
The solicitors were given invitation cards (Depart.
menfs Exhibit No. 4) which were advertised as being
complimentary tickets to ~llustrated lectures and which
offered the guest beautiful attendance prizes absolutely
free. The ticket stated the place and time at which such
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illustrated lecture would occur, required the bearer to place
his n·ame and address thereon, and carried a space upon
which the solicitor would write his name; such space stated
that the bearer was a guest of the solicitor. Nowhere on
the ticket was there an indication that the illustrated lecture
was a method of selling stock in an oil oompany. The
solicitor then, without detailed control as to time or terri-tory, would make such contacts and arrange to get as many
people as possible to attend such lecture. (Tr. 12)
At its place of business several evenings each week,
the company. regularly conducted lectures. Upon arriv:al
at the office, the prospect was requested to give his card to
an employee of the oompany. (Tr. 44) In this manner
the company was advised as to which solicitor and which
division manager was to be credited with the attendance
of the prospect and was to be given the right to sell hiin
stock. After the lecture, the solicitor would endeavor to
arrange a meeting, usually ~hat same evening, between the
prospect and the division manag·er. This was necessary,
because only the division manager had a license to sell the
stock of the company. The solicitor, being unlicensed,
was limited to purely ""prospect getting'", (Tr. 20, 38, 58)
and to convincing a prospect that a purchase of stock was
desirable. If a sale was made, the solicitor would become
entitled to a commission based upon the amount of such

sale.
One of the witnesses testified that she received eight
per cent for bringing in the prospect, and if she was in
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attendance in the office of the division manag~r when the
sale was made, she was entitled to an additional three per
cent commission. (Tr. 12, 34) As stated above, this
percentage of commission was set by the division manager
and deducted by the company from his twenty.-:five per
cent commission.
When a sale was consummated, the division manager
would fill out a contract form (Departmenfs Exhibit No.
2) which constituted an agreement between the prospect
and the Northern Oil Company. If he collected any
money on a sa1e, he was required to pay it to the company.
He was not .empowered to retain his commission or to retain
the solicitor"s commission. (Tr. 17)
The value of the stock for purposes of such sale was
set by the company, and during this period of time, such
stock was sold at a par value of ten cents per share. (De.
partmenfs Exhibit No. 3)
When a division manager _left the employ of the oom"
pany, those of his solicitors who desired to continue to
perform· services for the company were assigned to other
division managers by the sales manager. (Tr. 40)
In this case we are also conoerned with the contribution
liability of the co1npany upon remuneration paid to certain
of its officers and employees in the form of shares of stock.
The status of these officers and employees is not questioned.
Admittedly, Qthey performed services ""in employment"" for
the corporation; however, the corporation desiring to pay
such individuals for their services in some means other than
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cash would pay them in the form of stock. The testimony
does not indicate whether or not, in making such payment,
the employees and the company J:ieached any agreement
as to its value, but it does indicate that the company main-tained records of all such payments and that such records
reduced the share payments to dollar and cent values at a
rate of ten cents per share._ {Tr. 51) This is particularly
clear with respect to remuneration paid in the sum of shares
to Mr. Bergeson, its president, who, by minute entry of
the corporation, was to receive $200 per month in stock.
(Tr. 64, 66) (Depamnent's Exhibit ~~B,\ p. 2)

STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENTS
The plaintiff company makes two oontentions with
respect to the decision of the Industrial Commission. That:

( 1) The services performed by the solicitors on a com-mission basis are not services Hin employment',
within the provisions of Sections 19 (j) · ( 1),
19- (j) (5), and 19 (h) of the Utah Unemploy-ment Compensation Law, and seems to argue
that( a) Because the solicitors were free from detailed
direction as to the time, territory, and amount
of Hprospect getting,, they engaged in, they
did not fall within the definition of ~~employ-
ment', contained in the law.
(b) They were not Hin employment,, because
they devoted. little time to such soliciting
activities.
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(c) Such solicitors were not "'"in

employm~ent",

because they merely helped the division man.ager to sell but did not, themselves, have
power tJo directly consummate sales.
(d) Such solicitors were not ""in employment'\
because the division manag~ers were ""never
intending to hire on behalf of the company.''

{2) The Commission improperly placed a value of
ten cents per share upon the stock issued to
officers and others for services for purposes of
determining the company"s contribution liability.
(a) The company argues that the stock had no
mark!et or cash value and that, in the absence
of oil or other assets owned ~y the company,
it could not have a value for purposes of
fixing contribution liability.
(b) That because the company has no revenue
.or income and, therefore, any contribution
liability must be derived f11om a sale of stock,
the Industrial Commission improperly fixed
· contribution liability upon such remunera.
tion in kind.
The Industrial Commission takes the position that:

(1) The solicitors of the Northern Oil Company
performed services ""in employment"" within the
provisions of Sections 19 (j) (1), 19 (j) (5),
and 19 (h).
It argues:

A. That the company failed to meet to the satis"
faction of the Commission the (a), (b), and
(c) tests of Section 19 (j) ( 5).

B. That the solicitors performed. services for the
corporation within the provisions of Sections
19 (h) and 19 (j) ( 1) .
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( 2) The Commission placed a value of ten cents per
share upon stock issued to officers and others for
services for purposes of determining the contribu-tion liability of the company.
A.

The cash value set by the company upon its
shares of stock for purposes of sale to the
public constitutes a ""reasonable.,., cash value;

and
B.

The prospects of the company to succeed in
its oil venture and attain assets in addition
to its equipment is ""valuable.,.,.

ARGUMENT
I

THE SOLICITORS OF THE NORTHERN OIL
COMPANY PERFORMED SERVICES ""IN
EMPLOYMENT.,., WITHIN THE PROVI-SIONS OF SECTIONS 19 (j) (1), 19 (j) (5),
AND 19 (h).
A.

The company failed to meet to the satisfac-tion of the Commission, the (a), (b), and
(c) tests of Section 19 (j) ( 5).

The question of whether or not the solicitors of the
company performing services on a commission basis were
engaged in the performance of servioes ""in employment.,.,
within the provisions of the Utah Unemployment Compen-sation Law, again brings before this Court the interpreta-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tion of the term ""employment"" as used in the Law.

How.-

ever, it is not necessary in this brief to again re.-argue the
question of whether or not the Law carries its own definition
of employment or is controlled by the master--servant defini.
tion of common law.
On page 9 of its brief, the plaintiff states:
Whether theve is employment must be determined initially
from standards which the law affords . . . ".,

The plaintiff

concedes that the Law.,s definition is controlling.

This is

completely in accord with the position this Court has taken
in the past.

See its decisions in:

Gbobe Grain e.:Y Milling

Company v. Irndustrial Commission of Utah, et al., 98 Utah
36, 91 P. (2d) 512; Fuller Brush Company v. Industrial
Commiss~on

of Utah, et al., 98 Utah 230, 104 P. (2d) 201;

National 'Tunnel and Mines Compa>ny v. Industrial Colm"
mission of Utah,

.e,t

al, 99 Utah 39, 102 P. (2d) 508;

Logan--Cache Knitting Mills v. Endustrial Commission o1
Utah, et al., 99 Utah 1, 102 P. (2d) 495; Oombined
Metals Reduction Company, et al., v. Industrial Commission
of UtaJh, ( ...... Utah...... ), (Sept•ember 15, 1941); and Cre,am.
eries of America, line. v. Industrial Oommissvon of Ut!ah, et
al., 98 Utah 571, 102 P. (2d) 300.
We are solely concerned with the application of the
tests contained in the Law to the facts of this case. The
plaintiff company, through its brief, argues that if the
elements <?f detailed control over the time, place, and amount
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of service are lacking, the solicitors must be considered as
having performed services ""not in employment.'' Note its
language on page 9: "". . . Supervision or control by the
party sought to be charged as an employer ov~er the party
sought to be held as an employee must exist before there can
be a relationship of employment . . . " This argument ig-.nares the (b) and (c) provisions of Section 19 (j) ( 5) .
The Commission, however, takes the position that the
company failed to meet even the (a) test; the company did
exercise control over the solicitors. The solicitors were a
part of a well organized selling system which, through a
system of sales manager and division managers and illus-trated lectures, depended upon co--ordinated activities by
the solicitors. First of all, the solicitors were. ·controlled
as to the extent of their activities. They could not sell a
prospect, because of the lack of a license to sell, but they
were limited to obtaining prospects and turning them over
to their particular division managers. In order· to get a
portion of their commission, to wit, three per cent, in the
case of witness Caroline H. Albertson, they had to be present
at the interview between the prospect and the division
manager during which interview the sale ~as consummated.
In order to procure the presence of the prospect at the
illustrated lecture, they were required to use the device of
issuing an invitational ticket. (Departmenfs Exhibit No.4)
A glance at the organizational system of the company
discloses that the solicitors, in fact, always performed their
services in accordance with the system; this in itself indicates
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a control. A failure on the part of the solicitors to comply
with the sales system of the company would mean a failure
on the part of the solicitors to receive any commissions,
because they could not negotiate sales directly. The .mere
fact that they could devote as little time as they desired to
their activities as solicitors is immaterial; the fact remains
that unless they produced, they would not be paid.
The solicitors regularly followed a pattern of activity;
they attended sales ~eetings whenever possible at the offices
of the company-usually from eight to ten in the morningwhere they were taught new data concerning the company
whose stock they were selling, and they were instructed in
the method of procuring prospects. During the day, they
devoted themselves to contacting the public, unless other
private employment intervened. In the evenings, they at"
tended the illustrated lectures and acted as ""hosts'' to ""guest
prospects." After the lectures, the interviewers contrived
to attend the interviews between the ""guest prospects'' and
the division managers. Thus, it is seen, that although the
company did not control the place where the original soli"
citation of the prospect occurred, it did control the place
to which the soli~itors brought the prospects and the place
at which the solicitors were located when the division
manager consummated the sale.
The facts indicate that the amount of commission each
solicitor obtained was subject to the will of the division
manager. If the amount of prospects obtained by him was
satisfactory to the division manager, or if the solicitor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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seemed to be regularly following activities incidental to his
work, the division manager would tend to give him a better
commtSSlOn.
The effectiveness of the above controls was ehhanced
by the fact that the employment of the solicitors with the
company was subject to termination without notice. A
failure on the part of the solicitors to perform services ac-ceptable to the company could easily result in a lack of
employment upon the part of such individuals, making them
proper subjects for the benefits of unemployment compen-sation. Unquestionably, the power of discharge is a very
important element of control that may not be disregarded
in. determining whether or not the company has met test
(a) of this Section.
We believe that the Commission, under the foregoing
facts, reasonably concluded that the company failed to
satisfy the requirements of Section 19 (j) ( 5) (a); the com-pany failed to satisfy the Commission that:
~.~.(a)

such individual has been and will continue to
be free from control or direction over the performance
of such services, both under his contract of service and
in fact; and""
The company failed to satisfy the vequirements of sub-section (b) of Section 19 (j) ( 5), which provides:
~.~.(b)

such service is either outside the usual course
of the business for which such service is performed or
that such service is performed outside of all the places
of business of the enterprise for which such service is
performed; and""
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The testimony clearly shows that the company was
engaged in the business of promoting the prospecting of
oil and the sale of stock necessary to secure money for such
purposes. The Court"s attention is particularly referred
to the prospectus of the oompany. (Department's Exhibit
No. 3) Most of the activities of the company were devoted
to the sale of its stock. Nowhere in its brief does the
plaintiff company contest this fact. The solicitors as well
as the division managers of the company were engaged in the
selling of its stock. Certainly, the Commission reasonably
found that the activities of the solicitors were a part of the
usual course of business of the company.
The facts also indicate that a considerable portion of
the solicitors" activities occurred within the place of business
of the company. They attended sales meetings theliein and
after issuing complimentary guest tickets were required to
be present at the illustrated lectures and at the contacts
between the division managers and the prospects in order
to receive a portion of their commission. This fact is un"
controverted. The solicitors performed services both within
the usual course of business and within the place of business
of the company.
i

The company failed to satisfy the Commission with
respect to the test contained in Section 19 (j) ( 5) (c) of
the Law which provides:
:. (c) such individ~al is customarily engaged in an
Independently established trade, occupation, profession
or business.''
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Nowhere in the transcript is there any indication that
the solicitors were engaged in the activity of selling stock
as a part of their own customary and independently estab-lished business. In most instances it seems that the solici-tors became interested in the Northern Oil Company by
virtue of the fact that they had attended an illustrated
lecture and had been sold stock. Having once become
convinced that there were good prospects of finding oil,
they were willing to recommend the investment to their
friends. They would then devote themselves, in their
spare time, to making such contacts as they could and in
procuring the attendance of prospects at the illustrated
lectures. There is no conflict of fact with respect to this
statement. You will note that this description is repeated
on pages 9 and 10 of the brief of appellant. In fact, the
plaintiff company argues that the fact that most of the solici-tors were not regularly engaged in the sale of this stock is an
indication that they should not be considered as perform-ing services ""in employment',.
Of CQurse, there were a number of salesmen who seem-~ed to devote their entire time to such stock sales. Note
the testimony of witness Caroline H. Albertson. This very
statement of fact answers the question of whether or not
these solicitors wer·e customarily engaged in an indepen-dently established trade, occupation, profession, ur business.
If they had other activities, such activities were not of the
sam'e nature as the services performed for the Northern Oil
Company. They were employees of other concerns earn-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
ing their daily wage, or they were farmers operating their
own farm. In no instance has there been an introduction
of evidence indicating that any of these solicitors were
engaged in a stock brokerage business. In fact, the testi.mony unquestionably contradicts such a conclusion. The
solicitors did not have licenses permitting them to sell the
stock of the company; their whole activity was limited
to procuring prospects who were to be sold by their divi.sion manager. The conclusion of the transaction upon
which their commissions were based was beyond their con.trol. Such an arrangement is never true of an independently
established business unit.

All of the elements of control r•eferred to in the
argument with respect to subsection (a) are eleq1ents indi.cative of the fact that the solicitors were not engaged CUS"
tomarily in independently established trades, occupations,
or businesses.
The Commission reasonably concluded that the com"
pany faiLed to satisfy test (c) of Section 19 (j) ( 5) .
The attention of the Court is called to a very recent
decision by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi,
sian, Third Department, decided March 11, 1942, In the

Matter of the Claim for Be~efits under Article 18( ~f the
Labor Law Made by 'Thomas A. Doyle, Claimant, Kalama.zoo Stove e:Y Furnace Oo., Inc., Appellant v. Frieda S.
Miller, as Irndus.trial Commissioner, Respondent, CCH, N.
Y. 'lf8310.

In that case, a salesman hired bY. the company,s

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
branch manager to sell stoves and furnaces was held to be
an employee of the company within the meaning of the
New York law. The following is the language:
"!he appellant is a corporation engaged in the business
of manufacturing and selling stoves and furnaces, the
sales being made through factory branch offices main..
tained through several states. The terms and condi.tions under which the manager operated a branch
office or store was a printed form of supervisor's
commission contract. It is conceded· that the branch
manager is its employee within the law. In addition
to the sale of appellant's products, the branch manager
used appellant's office facilities and personnel for .the
purpose of soliciting and carrying out contracts for
cleaning and repairing furnaces. Through this medium
prospects were obtained for the purchase of appellant, s
products.
""The claimant was employed as a canvasser at the
Utica office. He was furnished with a business card
as follows:
Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Company
351 Columbia St., Utica, N. Y.
"A KALAMAZOO
DIRECT TO YOU'
Trade Mark Registered
Ranges-Furnaces-Hea~ers

T. A. Doyle
Phone 2.-8513
At least in two instances he was paid by the Company's
check direct from the head office and the orders he
obtained went directly to the head office with his
name on them.
""The evidence sustains the decision of the Appeal
Board which should be affirmed.
""Decision of the Appeal Board unanimously affirmed,
with costs.""
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B.

The solicitors performed services for the corpora.
tion within the provisions of Section 19 (h) and
Section 19 (j) ( 1).
Section 19 (j) ( 1) provides as follows:

"" (j) ( 1) "'Employm·ent,' subject to the other provisions
of this subsection, means service, . . . performed for
wages or under any contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied."
It is concerned with the question of whether or not the
VJorker performed services and whether or not such services
were performed under the terms of a contract of hire or
for wages.
In the case at hand, the solicitors undoubtedly per.
formed services. They carried out a major part of the
company's sales activities, attended meetings, procured pros.
pects, acted as their hosts while they attended illustrated
lectures, sat in attendance during meetings of such pros.
pects, issued guest tickets, and talked about the advantages
that ·ownership of stock of the Northern Oil Company
would bring.
These services were performed as the result of agree.
ments between the solicitors and division managers of the
company. In these agreements, the solicitors were offered
a commission payment based upon stock sold to any pros"
pects that they procured for the division managers. The
agreement called for the performance of services, resulted
from a meeting of the minds, and provided a consideration
therefor. All of the contractual elements are present. The
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services were performed as the result of a contract of hire.
In addition, the services were performed for wages.
Section 19 (p) of the Unemployment Compensation
Law, provides that:
"" (p) "Wages, means all remuneration payable for per-sonal services, including commissions and bonuses ... ''
(Italics ours)
You will note that the statute expressly includes as wages,
remuneration paid in the form of ""commissions."" The facts
are clear that the services were performed for a commission.
Both of the tests of Section 19 (p) are applicable.
The company contends, however, that the solicitors
were not ""in employment"" for the company. It implies
rather that they were ""in employment"" for the division mana-gers, because the division managers weve the individuals with
whom arrangements were made. By stipulation, (Tr. 46)
the plaintiff company concedes that the division managers
are employees of the company.
The Commission therefore contends that the provisions
of Section 19 (h) are applicable. Section 19 (h) provides:
"" ... Each individual employed to perform or to assist
in performing the work of any agent or employee of
an employing unit shall be deemed to be employed by
such employing unit for all the purposes of this act,
whether such individual was hired or paid directly by
such employing unit or by such agent or employee;
provided, the employing unit had actual or constructive
knowledge of the work ..,.,
With the actual or constructive knowledge of the company,
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ing the work of the division managers. Such an arrange.
ment was a part of the organizational plan of the company.
Although the division managers made the arrangement with
the solicitors and fixed the ·a:mount of commission payable,
the division managers were not permitted to pay the solicitors
their commission.
As has been pointed out heretofore, any cash received
from the sale of stock by the division manager was paid to
the company. The company then, at regular intervals,
m·ade commission payments to the division manager and to
the solicitors. It seems clear, therefore, that the company not
only had knowledge of the fact that any given solicitor had
been hired, but had knowledge of the amount of commission
he was to be paid and the extent of such solicitor., s activities.
The facts further indicate that the company knew,
with respect to each illustrated lecture, the number of
prospects each solicitor had secured. Each guest attend.ing the illustrated lecture was asked to leave his invitation
card at the desk.
The company urges, on page 11 of its brief, that these
solicitors were not employed to perform or assist in the
performance of the work of the salesmen. It argues:
"" ... They didn.,t do any of his work or any part of
it.
They merely helped him to increase his con"
tacts ... '' (Italics ours)
We submit that the word ""helped'' means assisted, and that
the function performed by the solicitor was a very· important
part of the functions performed by the division manager.
In fact, the volume of sales of each division manager was
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entirely dependent upon the extent of the activities of his
solicitors.
The company urges that the fact that the solicitors had
no license to sell is an indication that the solicitors were not
assisting the division manager. As a matter of fact, the
lack of a license in the solicitors is an additional indication
that they had no power to do anything but assist the division
manager. They could not complete a sale or earn any
commissions without having procuved the cooperation of
the division manager.
The oompany takes the further' position that Section
19 (h) must contemplate a hiring of the assistant by the
agent or employee ""for the company."" Section 19 (h)
contains no such limitation. It is sufficient if the agent
or employee of the company has employed another ""to per-form or to assist in performing the work"" of such agent or
employee. In fact, Section 19 (h) goes further and says
that the assistant must be deemed to be an employee of· the
employing unit ""whether such individual was hired or paid
directly by such employing unit or by such agent or em-ployee.,,
In this case, the facts clearly indicate that although
the solicitor was hired directly by the division man'ager,
he was paid din~ctly by the company. It is unnecessary
that the agent hire on behalf of the company as is argued
by plaintiff company. However, we submit that the facts
in~icate that the division manager did hire on behalf of the
company. Every act of such division manager was an act
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on behalf of the company. The creation of a sales organi..zation, the hiring of solicitors, the conclusion of each sale,
and all other acts which led toward the objective of the
company, to wit, the sale of stock, was an ·act by such
division manager on behalf of the company.

II
THE COMMISSION PROPERLY PLACED A VALUE
OF TEN CENTS PER SHARE UPON STOCK
ISSUED TO OFFICERS AND OTHERS FOR SER.VICES FOR PURPOSES OF DETERMINING
THE CONTRIBUTION LIABILITY OF THE
COMPANY.
In the course of its activities connected with the de.velopment of oil..-producing land and the sale of stock with
which to finan~e such activities, the services of a number of
employees, including officers, were found necessary. Be.cause of financial difficulties, however, the company paid
for such services by the issuance of stock in the company.
During the time that such stock payments were being made,
the company was actively engaged in the selling· of such
stock at the rate of ten cents per share which was the par
value of the stock. There was a short interval during
which the State Securities Commission ·suspended its license
to sell such security, but after some reorganization and a
change of officers, the suspension was lifted and the com'
pany resumed its development and promotional activities.
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The Commission used this same valuation, ten cents
per share, for the purpose of determining the contribution
liability of the company· with respect to the remuneration
paid to such employees.
Section 19 (p) of the Utah Unemployment Compen-sation Law defines ~.~.wages, to include:
"!he cash value of all remuneration payable in any
medium other than cash . . . The reasonable cash
value of remuneration payable in any m.edium other
than cash . . . shall be estimated and determined in
accordance with ru1es prescribed by the Commission.""
It is clear, first, that the choice of method of valuation
is left to the Commission, and that this Court, s review of the
method chosen is limited to an inquiry as to whether or not
such method is reasonable. This appears not only from the
section quoted, but also from the general principles govern-ing court review of the action of the administrative body
that where a question is committed to the discretion of an
administrative body, a reviewing court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the admi~strative body, Mississippi
Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282; Swayne
~Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297; Wessel v.
U:nited States, 49 F. (2d) 137.
It is clear, second, that the Commission"s finding of fact
as to the value of the stock is similarly protected from review
by the Supreme Court if there is any evidence to support
such a finding of fact by the administrative body, under Sec-.· tion 10 (h) of the Unemployment Compensation Law
which provides:
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""In any judicial proceeding under this .section the
findings of the commission as to the facts, 1f supported
by ·evidence . . . shall be conclusive, and the jurisdic.
tion of said court shall be confined to questions of law.,,
For the effect given by this court to a similar section in the
Utah Workmen,s Compensation Act, see Hauser v. Itrui'us.trial Commission, 77 Utah 45, 296 P. 780; Ellis-v. Industrml.
Commission, 91 Utah 432, 64 P (2d) 363. As to the scope
of review of an administrative valuation of stock, specifically,
see In re Lang Body Co., 92 F. (2d) 338; Universal Linsur.
ance Go. v. State Board of T,ax Appeals, 118 N.J. L. 538,
193 Atl. 915; Chicago, B. e:Y £?<.. Rwy. Co. v. Babcoc~, 204
U. S. 58 5, which are authority for the proposition that an
administrative valuation will not be upset if there is any
evidence on which such valuation might reasonably be made.
It is urged by plaintiff company that the stock has and
had no market value, ·and that petitioner had no assets
beyond the money collected for stock and its
chance of
.,.
striking· oil.
That plaintiff company had no assets beyond these
seems to be a.n alLegation that the ""book value,, of the stock
was low. That the administrative agency disregarded book
value in its valuation of stock has never been regarded as
a ground for upsetting the administrative valua~ion as un"
reasonable. See Citizens Nat~onal Ban~ v. Board, ( ......Ore.
...... ), 222 P. 341, citing Justice Holmes to this effect in
National Ban~ v. New· Bedford, 155 Mass. 313, 29 N. E.
532; Universal Insur·ance Co. v. State Bo1ard' of 'Tax
Appeals, supr,a. Though the court in Oolnti~rvemtal NatioruLl
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

25
Ban~

v. Naylor, 54 Utah 49, 179 P. 67 is limited by a
definition of ~"actual cash value.,, of bank stock contained
in the tax statute as construed, it cites with approval cases
based on the statement of this position by Justice Holmes
which holds that a ~.~.book valu·e,, is not the only reasonable
basis for valuation of stock.
Plaintiff company also alleges that there is no evidence
of market value in the record. It is true that stock of
plaintiff company is not freely bought and sold on an ex-change so that market value in the accepted sense is set
for it by such transactions. Nevertheless, there is a great
deal of evidence in the record that the stock has exchange
value. The stock had been sold and was being sold to the
public at ten cents a share; whether or not this was done
through a high pressure campaign seems irrelevant. There
is also evidence that the owners of certain land accepted as
consideration for certain oil leases granted the company, two
and one half shares of stock per acre in addition to royalties
from any oil that might be found. It is clear, furthermore,
that the company is now carrying on development -work,
and has the same chanoe of striking oil that it had at any
time when the stock was sold to the public. Finally, the
fact that the Securities Commission lifted the suspension
order which had for a while prevented the company,s sale
of stock shows that the company is a going concern. It does
not seem unreasonable, in the light of all this evidence of
dealing in the stock, to take the selling price of the stock as
evidence of its market value.
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Industrial Commission respectfully
submits that the circumstances surrounding the performance
of services by the solicitors are similar to the factual situation ·
that existed in the case of GLobe Gravn & Milling Company
v. Industrial Commission ~of UtctAh, et al., supra. Any differ.ence in fact between the two cases is one which arises out
of a greater hedging in by the Northern Oil Company of
activiti,es by the solicitors.
We, therefore, contend that the services performed
by the solicitors must be determined to be services ""in em.ployment", and that the decision of the Industrial Com.mission should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,
Attorney GeneraL

A.M. FERRO,
Special Assistant .
Attorney General .•
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Assistant
Attorney General·.
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